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I prove that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy
‘Disagreement Point Convexity’ and ‘Midpoint Domination’. I explain
how this improves previous results obtained by Chun (1990) and by Dagan
et al. (2002).
1 Introduction
Dagan et al. (2002) prove that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution
to satisfy the following seven properties when there are exactly two players:
‘Symmetry’, ‘Weak Pareto Optimality’, ‘Scale Covariance’, ‘Single-Valuedness
in Symmetric Problems’, ‘Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alterna-
tives’, ‘Twisting’ and ‘Disagreement Point Convexity’. I improve the result
by showing that 1) The six ﬁrst properties implies ‘Midpoint Domination’ (see
Thomson, 1994, section 4.1), the converse being not true; 2) The Nash bar-
gaining solution is the only solution to satisfy ‘Disagreement Point Convexity’
and ‘Midpoint Domination’; 3) The last result remains valid with more than
two players, provided that some regularity condition is imposed on the set of
feasible agreements. My axiomatic result is closely related to Chun (1990). The
proof being diﬀerent, I am able to show among other things that his continuity
axiom is redundant.
2 Deﬁnitions
Let n be a positive integer and let N := {1,...,n} be the set of players. A
bargaining problem is a couple (V,d) where V ⊆ RN is the set of utility vectors
that the players can achieve through cooperation and d ∈ V is the utility vector
that prevails in case of disagreement. The players have a strict interest to coop-
erate (d << v for some v ∈ V ) and the set V of feasible agreements is compact,
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1convex and non-level. Non-level means that the utilities are transferable above
the disagreement point (of course not necessarily at a one to one exchange rate).
If a vector is orthogonal to V at some individually rational utility vector, then
it is strictly positive. I also assume that V is smooth when there are more than
two players. This means that V admits a unique supporting hyperplane at each
utility vector that is Pareto optimal and individually rational.
A solution is a function that associates a nonempty set of feasible utility
vectors to each bargaining problem. For instance, the Nash bargaining solution
selects the utility vector that maximizes the product of the utility gains of the
players over the set of feasible agreements that are individually rational, i.e.




(vi − di). (1)
3 Main Result
Here are two restrictions that could be imposed on a solution Σ. They are sup-
posed to hold for each bargaining problem (V,d).
Disagreement Point Convexity (DPC) If σ ∈ Σ(V,d), then σ ∈ Σ(V,πd +
(1 − π)σ) for each π ∈]0,1[.
If σ is a reasonable agreement for a bargaining problem (V,d), then so should
it remain for the modiﬁed problem (V,πd + (1 − π)σ). The solution has to be
invariant to movements of the disagreement point towards the ﬁnal agreement.
The axiom was ﬁrst introduced by Peters and van Damme (1991). Chun and
Thomson (1990) apply a similar axiom imposing some linearity on the solution
with respect to the disagreement point. I refer to these papers for justiﬁcations
in terms of invariance with respect to resolution of the uncertainty about the
disagreement point. Dagan et al. (2002) relate the axiom to properties of the
non-cooperative bargaining models.
Midpoint Domination (MD) If σ ∈ Σ(V,d), then σ ≥
P
i∈N ai(V,d)/n, where
ai(V,d) := argmax{v∈V |v−i≥d−i} vi, for each i ∈ N.
If player i had all the bargaining power, the outcome would be ai(V,d). A
natural reference point when the players have equal bargaining abilities is ob-
tained by mixing these extreme points, using a uniform probability distribution.
It is only because of its lack of eﬃciency that the random dictatorship principle
has to be amended. The objective of most bargaining solutions is to specify a
way to split the remaining surplus when the midpoint is not Pareto optimal.
For instance, the discrete Raiﬀa bargaining solution (see Luce and Raiﬀa, 1957,
pages 136-137) considers the midpoint as a partial agreement and applies recur-
sively the random dictatorship argument up to the Pareto frontier. The solution
of Kalai and Smorodinski (1975) follows the direction deﬁned by the disagree-
ment point and the midpoint up to the Pareto frontier. I prove hereafter that the
2Nash solution itself satisﬁes the axiom. Though natural and powerful, MD has
not been used frequently in the literature. The only references that I am aware
of are Moulin (1983) and Chun (1990). I discuss these papers in the next section.
Theorem The Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy ‘Dis-
agreement Point Convexity’ (DPC) and ‘Midpoint Domination’ (MD).
The proof is based on the following characterization of the Nash bargaining
solution suggested by Harsanyi (1959). It is obtained by separating V from
the set of utility pairs whose Nash product is greater than its evaluation at the
solution. Both sets are indeed convex.
Lemma (Harsanyi, 1959) Let σ ∈ V . Then, σ is the Nash bargaining solu-
tion if and only if σ >> d and there exists λ ∈ RN
++ such that
a. λ.σ = maxv∈V λ.v
b. (∀(i,j) ∈ N × N) : λi(σi − di) = λj(σj − dj).
The lemma can be interpreted as follows: the Nash bargaining solution is
the only feasible agreement that satisﬁes simultaneously the utilitarian and the
egalitarian objectives for some re-scaling of the individual utilities (see Shapley,
1969; Myerson, 1991, section 8.3).
Proof of the theorem: The Nash bargaining solution satisﬁes both DPC and
MD as a consequence of the lemma. Indeed, the two conditions stated there
implies that σ =
P
i∈N ai(V λ,d)/n where V ⊆ V λ := {x ∈ RN|λ.x ≤ λ.σ}. On
the other hand, λi(σi − (πdi + (1 − π)σi)) = πλi(σi − di) for each i ∈ N.
Let Σ be a solution that satisﬁes both DPC and MD, let (V,d) be a bargain-
ing problem and let σ ∈ Σ(V,d). As d is not weakly Pareto optimal, MD implies
that σ >> d. Observe also that σ is Pareto optimal. Otherwise, the condition
σ ∈ Σ(V,πd + (1 − π)σ) imposed by DPC is incompatible with MD when π is
small. Let λ ∈ RN
++ be a vector that is orthogonal to V at σ. Condition a of




aj(V,πd + (1 − π)σ)
n
(2)
for each π ∈ [0,1], which amounts to
(n − 1)(σi − di) ≥
ai
i(V,πd + (1 − π)σ) − σi
π
(3)
for each i ∈ N and each π ∈ [0,1]. Taking the limit as π tends to zero and using
the fact that V is smooth, I obtain






3for each i ∈ N. Hence,




for each i ∈ N. Taking the sum over i, I conclude that the inequality cannot
be strict. The right term does not depend on i. Condition b of the lemma is
therefore satisﬁed.
I now prove the theorem for two-player bargaining problems without assum-
ing that V is smooth. Let v : R → R be the concave function that represents
the Pareto frontier of V , i.e. x2 = v(x1) if and only if x is strongly Pareto










r denote respectively the left and right derivatives of v. Hence
condition a of the lemma is satisﬁed with λ = (σ2 −d2,σ1 −d1). Condition b is
trivially satisﬁed as well. 
The Nash bargaining solution does not necessarily satisfy MD when V is not
required to be non-level. For instance, let n = 2, let d = (0,0) and let V be the
convex hull of the vectors (0,0), (1,1) and (2,0). The Nash bargaining solution
is {(1,1)}, but [a1(V,d) + a2(V,d)]/2 = (3/2,1/2).
The Nash bargaining solution is not the only solution to satisfy DPC and
MD when V is not smooth and there are more than two players. For instance,
let n = 3, let ˆ V be the convex hull of the vectors (0,0,0), (15,0,0), (0,15,0),
(10,10,0) and (0,0,10), and let Σ be the solution deﬁned as follows: Σ(V,d) :=
ΣNash(V,d) ∪ {(5,5,5)} if (V,d) = (ˆ V ,π(0,0,0) + (1 − π)(5,5,5)) for some
π ∈ [0,1] and Σ(V,d) := ΣNash(V,d) for each other bargaining problem (V,d).
Notice that (5,5,5) 6∈ ΣNash(V,π(0,0,0) + (1 − π)(5,5,5)) for each π ∈]0,1[.
The solution Σ obviously satisﬁes DPC. It also satisﬁes MD because (5,5,5) ≥ P3
i=1 ai(ˆ V ,π(0,0,0) + (1 − π)(5,5,5))/3 for each π ∈ [0,1]. Indeed, a1 = (5 +
10π,5(1 − π),5(1 − π)), a2 = (5(1 − π),5 + 10π,5(1 − π)) and a3 = (5(1 −
π),5(1−π),10−5(1−π)). The theorem may be adapted in order to axiomatize
the Nash bargaining solution for non-smooth problems with more than two
players by focusing on single-valued solutions that are continuous. It should be
noted though that the smoothness assumption is a mild and natural regularity
condition.
4 Related Literature
I start by citing some related results that are not directly comparable. Moulin
(1983) (see Thomson, 1994, section 4.1) shows that the Nash bargaining solu-
tion is the only single-valued solution to satisfy MD and ‘Independence over
Irrelevant Alternatives’. I proved that a similar result holds with DPC instead
of IIA. Peters and van Damme (1991) apply a ﬁxed-point argument in order
to show that the Nash bargaining solution is the only single-valued solution
4to satisfy DPC, ‘Disagreement Point Continuity’, ‘Scale Covariance’, ‘Symme-
try’, ‘Eﬃciency’ and ‘Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives’.
I obtained a similar result with MD replacing the ﬁve last axioms, allowing for
multi-valued solutions and restricting my attention to smooth problems when
there are more than two players.
Chun (1990, theorems 1 and 3) uses MD together with axioms that are
slightly stronger than DPC (‘Weak Disagreement Point Linearity’ and ‘Lin-
earity’, see also Chun and Thomson, 1990) in order to characterize the Nash
bargaining solution. Nevertheless, he imposes in addition axioms of continuity
and optimality. He also restricts his attention to single-valued solutions. I show
that these properties are redundant, at least for smooth problems when there are
more than two players. Chun’s proof depends heavily on the continuity axiom
(even in case of smooth problems) as he ﬁrst proves his results for polyhedron
problems and then applies a limit argument. The continuity axiom is especially
annoying for an approach whose objective is to work with ﬁxed feasible sets,
imposing restrictions involving variations of the disagreement point only.
I devote the rest of the section to explain why my theorem improves the
previous result obtained by Dagan et al. (2002). Their argument is valid only
for bargaining problems with two players. They prove under this assumption
that the Nash bargaining solution is the only solution to satisfy DPC along with
the following six axioms that are supposed to hold for each bargaining problem
(V,d).
Symmetry A bargaining problem (V,d) is symmetric if d1 = d2 and V =
{(v2,v1)|v ∈ V }. If (V,d) is symmetric, then Σ(V,d) = {(σ2,σ1)|σ ∈ Σ(V,d)}.
Weak Pareto Optimality Any element of Σ(V,d) is weakly Pareto optimal.
Scale Covariance Σ(αV + β) = αΣ(V,d) + β, for each α ∈ R2
++ and each
β ∈ R2.
Single-Valuedness in Symmetric Problems If (V,d) is symmetric, then
Σ(V,d) is a singleton.
Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives If a bargain-
ing problem (V 0,d) is such that {v ∈ V 0|v ≥ d} = {v ∈ V |v ≥ d}, then
Σ(V 0,d) = Σ(V,d).
Twisting Let σ ∈ Σ(V,d), let i ∈ {1,2} and let (V 0,d) be a bargaining problem
such that V \ V 0 ⊆ {x ∈ R2|xi > σi} and V 0 \ V ⊆ {x ∈ R2|xi < σi}. Then,
σ0
i ≤ σi for some σ0 ∈ Σ(V 0,d).
These axioms together imply MD as the following argument shows. Let
(V,d) be a bargaining problem and let σ ∈ Σ(V,d). Suppose that σ 6= u1(V,d).
Let V 0 be the set of individually rational utility pairs that is bounded above
by the line going through the points σ and u1(V,d). By the ﬁrst four ax-




2 ,x)} for some x ∈ R. By ‘Independence of Non-
Individually Rational Alternatives’, σ ∈ Σ(ˆ V ,d) where ˆ V is the set of individu-
ally rational utility pairs that belong to V . By ‘Twisting’, σ1 ≥ (d1+u1
1(V,d))/2.
A similar argument implies that σ2 ≥ (d2 + u2
2(V,d))/2 if σ 6= u2(V,d). It is
then easy to conclude.
On the contrary, MD does not imply the above axioms. In fact, it does not
even imply any of them. Here are examples of solutions that satisfy MD but
violates some of the above axioms. The solution that is obtained by projecting
vertically (upward) the midpoint on the Pareto frontier of the feasible set does
not satisfy ‘Symmetry’, the solution that selects the midpoint does not satisfy
‘Weak Pareto Optimality’, the solution that equally split the surplus above the
midpoint does not satisfy ‘Scale Covariance’, the solution that selects the set
of Pareto optimal utility vectors that dominates the midpoint does not satisfy
‘Single-Valuedness in Symmetric Problems’, the solution that maximizes the
product of the utility gains with respect to the downward vertical projection of
the disagreement point on the boundary of the feasible set and over the set of
feasible utility vectors that Pareto dominate the midpoint does not satisfy ‘In-
dependence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives’, and ﬁnally the solution
that selects the utility vectors on the Pareto frontier that are the closest to the
midpoint does not satisfy ‘Twisting’.
Notice ﬁnally that MD is deﬁned for a given bargaining problem although
‘Scale Covariance’, ‘Independence of Non-Individually Rational Alternatives’
and ‘Twisting’ involve comparisons between diﬀerent bargaining problems with
diﬀerent feasible sets.
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